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Abstract 
Based on the political economy of the media perspective, this paper explores the media coverage of wealth and 
inheritance taxation over the early 21st century (2000 to 2018) based on a large-scale corpus of seven German 
daily and weekly newspapers. Germany is a useful case study, being one of the most unequal countries in the 
Eurozone area in terms of wealth inequality. Drawing on text mining methods and corpus linguistics, it shows 
that wealth and inheritance taxation is a relatively infrequent topic over the entire period, with the exception 
of a few intense months of increased reporting. On the occasions that the media do report on the topic of 
wealth and inheritance taxation, it is mainly covered in terms of a political debate. This debate centres on the 
politics of a possible reform process and the connected difficulties of finding compromise between different 
actors, rather than focussing on the potential economic impact. Furthermore, this paper explores the power of 
agents (both on the organisational and individual level) as the primary definers of social reality. It shows that 
market-liberal and conservative organisations and economists dominate the news over social-democratic and 
left-wing ones. Overall, the findings indicate a hostile news coverage concerning the introduction of wealth 
taxation and the increase of inheritance tax. 
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1. Introduction  
The development of wealth inequality and its determinants have received increasing attention over 
the past years. A growing body of empirical research on the economics of inequality shows that since 
the 1980s wealth inequality increased in almost all high-income countries (Piketty & Zucman 2015; 
Piketty 2014). Data is still fragmented, but studies in those countries for which good long-term data 
is available highlight that the cross-generational transmission of wealth in the form of gifts and 
inheritance is a major reason for the persistence of wealth inequality over time (Adermon et al. 2018; 
Piketty 2011; Roine & Waldestrom 2009). 
Against this background, the politics underlying the growth of wealth inequality have attracted 
increasing scholarly interest in recent years (Emmenegger & Marx 2019; Trevor 2016; Gallas et al. 
2014). A central driver for the increasing wealth inequality and the strengthened role of inherited 
wealth is tied to the decreasing tax rates on net wealth and inheritance: “the level of wealth 
inequality prevailing today is primarily determined by past rates of inheritance [and wealth] taxation” 
(Scheve & Stasavage 2016, p. 108; see also Piketty & Zucman 2015; Beckert 2013). While inheritance 
taxation used to be around 30-40 per cent on average in the industrialised countries in the period 
after the Second World War, it was lowered or entirely abolished in the decades following the 
neoliberal revolution in the late 1970s. Regarding a general wealth tax, half of the OECD countries 
used to tax wealth a few decades ago, which by now has been reduced to only three countries - 
Switzerland, Norway and Spain (Drometer et al. 2018). 
So far, the role of mass media in portraying the politics underlying increasing wealth inequality 
essentially remains largely unexplored, which is paradoxical given the central role of the media for 
shaping public perception of, as well as debates about economic policy. Grisold & Theine (2017) 
survey existing empirical literature on the role of media coverage of economic inequality and 
redistribution policies. They highlight that media coverage tends to be biased “toward[s] 
individualistic explanations, and a neglect of the positive implications of redistributional policies to 
diminish inequality” (p. 4278). An in-depth analysis of the media coverage during the Piketty debate 
in 2014 and 2015 reveals that redistribution policies are addressed to a lesser extent than the topic 
of inequality and are a much more contested issue, with a neoliberal framing underlying much of the 
discourse (Grisold & Theine forthcoming; Rieder & Theine forthcoming, 2019). Moreover, German 
newspapers' reporting has been found to be predominantly hostile to the introduction of wealth 
taxation and the increase of inheritance taxation (Leipold forthcoming; Lichtenstein et al. 2016). Tax 
cuts during the Bush administration, whose beneficiaries were mainly wealthy taxpayers, are 
predominantly portrayed by the media in “collectivist” terms as “all Americans” would receive tax 
cuts or eventually benefit from a reduced tax burden (Bell & Entman 2011; Limbert & Bullock 2009).  
To date, there are hardly any studies addressing the role of the media in the long-term reporting on 
redistribution policies. In order to fill this void, this paper explores the coverage of wealth and 
inheritance taxation over the early 21st century (2000 to 2018) in seven German newspapers. 
Drawing on text mining methods and corpus linguistics, the media coverage is investigated with a 
focus on the quantitative number of newspaper articles, frequent words and word combinations and 
an analysis of sources as primary definers of the debate. The results indicate that wealth and 
inheritance taxation are an infrequent topic over the entire period, with the exception of a few 
intense months of increased reporting. When covered, both taxes are predominantly discussed as a 
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political matter that centres on the reform process of inheritance taxation. Further to this, the 
media's reports focus on the struggles to find a compromise between different political actors in 
achieving aforementioned reforms. Regarding institutionalised sources, this paper shows that 
market-liberal and conservative positions dominate over social-democratic and left wing ones, both 
with regards to organisations and to economists in the news. Overall, the findings hint toward a 
hostile news coverage regarding the re-introduction of wealth taxation and the increase of 
inheritance tax in Germany. 
The paper is structured in the following way: section 2 provides a short discussion of the wealth 
concentration in Germany and clarifies the institutional setting of both inheritance and wealth 
taxation. Section 3 introduces the theoretical perspective of this study (Political Economy of the 
Media) and conceptually explores its focus. Section 4 describes the methodology employed. Section 
5 and 6 outlines the empirical findings and section 7 discusses and concludes this paper’s 
contribution. 
2. The institutional setting: Inheritance and wealth taxation in Germany 
Germany provides a useful case study, being one of the most unequal countries in the Eurozone area 
in terms of wealth distribution (Bach et al. 2018; Leitner 2016). The ten per cent richest people own 
around 63 per cent of total wealth, while the top 1 per cent own around 31 per cent of wealth.2 In 
contrast, large parts of the population do not hold significant amounts of wealth. Furthermore, there 
is a high persistence of wealth levels at different parts of the distribution. Households with large 
amounts of wealth are very unlikely to change their position within the wealth distribution over time. 
Simultaneously, households with little or no wealth at all are very unlikely to increase their wealth 
stock significantly (Bach et al. 2018; Grabka 2014). One major reason for the persistence of wealth 
inequality is the transmission over generations in the form of gifts and inheritances, which leads to 
about 25 to 40 per cent of overall wealth in Germany being inherited (Fessler & Schürz 2018; Leitner 
2016). Simulations indicate that the overall value of bequests and gifts has increased sharply in 
recent years, reaching annual amounts of around 200 to 300 billion Euros per year, which is 
equivalent to about 10 per cent of national income (Bach & Thiemann 2016a).  
A close examination of the German situation reveals that wealth and inheritance taxation plays a 
major role for wealth inequality and its persistence over time. Net wealth, which exceeds certain 
personal allowances, was subject to taxation from 1923 to 1997.3 In the Weimar Republic, wealth tax 
rates ranged between 0.1 and 1 per cent. In 1946, tax rates were significantly increased to 1 and 2.5 
per cent for natural persons and to 2 and 2.5 per cent for legal persons. From 1978 onwards, tax 
rates were reduced to 0.5 per cent for legal persons and 0.7 per cent for natural persons (Wieland 
2003). Over the entire period, tax revenue from wealth was moderate with around 0.2 to 0.6 per 
2 Estimations of wealth inequality contain a range of uncertainties: household surveys have a crucial drawback 
of non-response and under-reporting; furthermore, certain parts of wealth is hidden in tax havens. This 
uncertainty with respect to the top wealth distribution certainly leads to an underestimation of "true" wealth 
levels (Vermeulen, 2018, 2016; Bach et al 2018; Alstadsæter et al. 2018). 
3 The German legislation defines net wealth as the combined value of real estate, financial and business assets 
as well as luxury goods minus debt obligations of natural and legal persons (corporate entities, foundations, 
cooperatives and associations) (Wieland 2003).  
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cent of the GDP (Bach & Beznoska 2012; Bach 1997). In 1995, the German constitutional court ruled 
wealth tax unconstitutional. The court argued that the failure to adapt real estate assessment (which 
has not been reformed since the 1960s) resulted in an unfair privilege for estate wealth in contrast to 
other forms of wealth (Bach 1997; see Wieland 2003 for details on the legal process). In the following 
two years, the government failed to reach an agreement over a reformed wealth tax which led to the 
expiration of the tax in 1997 (van Kommer & Kosters 2013; Bach & Beznoska 2012). 
As for inheritance taxation, the German development mirrors international trends: over the second 
half of the 20th century, tax rates were reduced substantially.4 Top tax rates were around 80 per cent 
(with lower levels for spouses and direct descendants5) after the Second World War, but were 
gradually reduced to around 20-25 per cent on average in the 1990s. In the course of the 1990s tax 
exemptions on business assets increased significantly (in 1993 and 1996), leaving considerable parts 
of bequeathed businesses untaxed (Scheve & Stasavage 2012; Houben & Maiterth 2011). 
In the 21st century, inheritance taxation has been ruled unconstitutional twice – in 2006 and 2014. In 
both incidents, the legislature was given approximately two years to reform the tax act (see table A.1 
appendix for details). The necessity to reform inheritance tax law led to heated debates and 
diverging positions in the governing coalitions in both years. In 2014, the reform negotiations even 
went into overtime due to a veto of the Federal States in the Federal Council of Germany 
(Bundesrat). Eventually, an agreement was reached in the parliament's mediation committee. 
Summarising both court rulings and the subsequent reforms (see table A.1 appendix for details), a 
main stumbling block was the question of how to deal with the bequest of business assets. Both 
court rulings centred on the tax exemptions granted for the bequest of businesses and the failure of 
the law to treat different wealth classes in an equal way. In both tax reform processes, the governing 
coalitions struggled to meet the criteria set by the constitutional court (and in the first reform 
obviously failed to do so).  
In both reformed tax acts, the respective tax exemptions rejected by the constitutional court were 
changed and abolished; yet, at the same time, new exemptions were being introduced. In the 2008 
reform, the exemption of businesses being valued below market value was removed. At the same 
time, a new loophole for business assets was installed: the bequest of businesses could be exempted 
from taxation to 85 per cent or even entirely in case the heir continues to operate the business and 
ensures that the total payroll does not undercut certain thresholds in the next seven years (Bach 
2016, 2015; Maiterth 2013; Houben & Maiterth 2011). 
4 The general structure of inheritance and gift taxation dates back to the German Inheritance Tax Act 
(Erbschaft- und Schenkungsteuergesetz, ErbStG) of 1906. It applies to transfers of various forms of property 
(for instance, real estate, financial and business assets) from one person to another regardless of whether the 
transfer results from inheritance or donation. Subject to the taxation is the enrichment of the recipient (and 
not the wealth of the deceased person) in the event of the bequest as well as previous donations in within the 
last years. In its original form, close relatives (spouse, children and grandchildren) were granted exemption; for 
others, inheritance tax rates were increased progressively. Later on, close relatives also became subject to 
progressive inheritance taxation although at much higher personal allowances in comparison to non-relatives 
(Houben & Maiterth 2011; Crezelius 2007). 
5 The inheritance tax act distinguishes between different tax classes: spouses and direct descendants (tax class 
I), siblings (tax class II) and other persons (tax class III). All tax classes are subject to progressive taxation, but 
with diverging tax rates and personal allowances. Generally, tax rates are much lower and less progressive.in 
tax class I, at the same time personal allowances are higher, which reflects the primacy of the family in the 
inheritance taxation (Section 15 ErbStG; Brunner 2014; Beckert 2007).  
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This loophole led to 171 billion euros in corporate assets being bequeathed tax free between 2009 
and 2015. In part, the loophole has been used for inheritance planning (discussed as ‘anticipatory 
effects’ in the related literature): inheritances of large-scale businesses with a total value of 37 billion 
euros were bequeathed to underage persons at a particularly high rate during this period (Bach 
2016; Bach & Mertz 2016). In light of such figures, Bach (2016) argues that the exemption of business 
assets from inheritance taxation might haven even intensified with the 2008 reform. 
In the most recent 2016 reform, some exemptions for business assets have been reduced. 
Concurrently, others remain effective or were newly introduced (see table A.1 for details). In 
particular, the exemption from taxation to 85 or even 100 per cent remains effective for businesses 
up to a value of 26m euros. Above that threshold, several intricate regulations allow for heirs of 
businesses to choose their preferred option. An heir can either provide evidence that they are not 
able to pay the due tax (Bedürfnisprüfung) or opt for the ablation model (Abschmelzmodel), which 
allows for postponement of inheritance or gift taxes on business assets for a period of ten years.  
As a consequence, the taxes on inheritance remain very low. In some cases business assets are still 
bequeathed tax-free. In comparison to the previous reform, microsimulations for different case 
studies (small, medium size, large business with varying capital endowments) show that the taxation 
of business asset bequests only increases in a small number of cases, while the majority of business 
inheritance will remain untaxed (Franke et al. 2016; Scholz & Truger 2016b). The low levels of 
inheritance taxation and the continuing exemptions for business assets have led several scholars to 
question the compatibility of the 2016 inheritance tax reform with the 2014 verdict of the 
constitutional court (Butterwegge 2018; Horn et al. 2017). 
Overall, the design of wealth and inheritance taxation leads to a limited role of both taxes for the 
total revenue. In sum, the different forms of wealth taxation have been around 3 per cent of GDP in 
the period just after the Second World War and constantly reduced to less than 1 per cent since the 
mid-1990s. Thereof, the tax revenue from inheritances is between 0.2 and 0.3 per cent of GDP, while 
taxes on net wealth were reduced to zero after the expiration in 1997. Real estate taxation and taxes 
on financial and capital transaction make up around 0.3 and 0.4 per cent of GDP. Hence, in 
comparison to other forms of taxation (e.g. taxes on consumption and labour income), wealth 
taxation plays a minor role in the overall tax structure (Bach 2014). In absolute terms, tax revenue 
from inheritances and gifts was about 6.3 billion euros in 2017 (Destatis 2018). Compared to existing 
estimations of the total value of inheritances of 200 to 300 billion euros, this signifies the limited tax 
burden on inheritance of roughly 2 per cent on average (Bach & Thiemann 2016a).  
Wealth and inheritance taxation could, in principle, have a stronger role in equalising unequal 
distributions, while at the same time raising state revenue. Based on a microsimulation model, Bach 
& Thiemann (2016b) show that a wealth tax could generate around 10 to 20 billion euros of annual 
tax revenue – even with high tax allowances and a tax rate of only 1 per cent. Likewise, a moderate 
increase of inheritance tax rates and an abatement of business asset exemptions could generate 
revenues of around 10 to 15 billion euros (Bach 2016). Hence, existing inheritance and wealth 
taxation is very much anchored in the belief that property rights of the wealthy (families) need to be 
protect, rather than in a belief in the redistribution of wealth and property to support democratic 
structures and public finances (Beckert 2007).  
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3. Theoretical perspective: Political Economy of the Media  
In principle, there are many traditions and approaches to analyse media coverage and the role of the 
media more generally. In this article, I conceive the media from the Political Economy of the Media
(henceforth PEoM) perspective as this perspective has long been concerned with inequalities in 
society and how these are reflected and/or perpetuated by communication structures (see for 
instance McChesney 2008). 
PEoM is based on a (critical) political economy tradition, which – put in very general terms –
understands capitalist social relations being organized around class-based power, which translates 
into the ability to control and influence economic processes, production, distribution and 
consumption (Mosco 2009). From this perspective, the media system is thought of as an industry 
that produces and distributes commodified communication with the aim of generating profits, 
thereby acting just like any other industry. 
In addition to profit generation, the media system has another function: “[…] communication is taken 
to be a special and particularly powerful commodity because […] it contains symbols and images 
whose meaning help to shape consciousness” (Mosco 2009, p. 134). Here, Mosco emphasises the 
double function of the media system: any purchased form of communication (e.g. a newspaper 
article) not only leads to a potential profit for the producer (e.g.  the owner of the newspaper) but 
also diffuses certain “symbols and images” to the public (see also Grisold 2004 for a detailed account 
of the media system’s double function). 
Looking more specifically into the diffusion of “symbols and images”, PEoM scholars stress that the 
role of media has to be conceived not only in the transmission of information, but more 
fundamentally in the construction of social reality. The media system’s role is all-encompassing in the 
sense that “reality” is often not conceivable without the media system itself (Grisold 2009, 2004). 
This is because people to large extents need to rely on symbols and images shared and diffused via 
the media system, as the “real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for 
direct acquaintance” (Lippmann 1922/2018, 16). Accordingly, individuals must resort to the images 
and stories that are shared by the media system in order to be able to make sense of ‘reality’. 
As mentioned, the PEoM approach purports the class‐based nature of capitalist societies with laws 
and policies tending to serve the interests of the capitalist class. Here, the media plays a fundamental 
role:
the “[…] media constitute the space where power relationships are decided between competing social 
and political actors. Therefore, almost all actors and messages must go through the media in order to 
achieve their goals” (Castells 2009, p. 194).6
The so-called Propaganda Model by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988) takes up exactly this 
relationship between the media, dominant social institutions and powerful classes by developing five 
filter elements that limit the scope upon what becomes news. These filter elements are: (1) the size, 
ownership and profit orientation of mainstream media; (2) advertising as a major source of revenue 
for media and the resultant influence on news production processes; (3) mainstream media’s 
routinized reliance on agents of power as the primary definers of social reality; (4) organized flaks 
6 Apart from “social and political actors“, power relations between competing economic actors are obviously 
important, too. 
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that represents mechanisms of social control; and (5) various ideological forces related to class 
interests (Herman & Chomsky 1988; see also Mullen & Klaehn 2010; Klaehn 2003). 
This paper takes up the notion that media are part of an ideological arena where class-based views 
are competing to achieve their goals. In particular, I focus on filter three of the Propaganda Model –
the power of agents as the primary definers of social reality. Primary definers are institutional, 
“expert” sources for journalists, often those to whom journalists first speak to understand a news 
event or issue. This gives them powerful influence over news content:  
“The important point about the structured relationship between the media and the primary institutional 
definers is that it permits the institutional definers to establish the initial definition or primary 
interpretation of the topic in question. This interpretation then ‘commands the field’ in all subsequent 
treatment and sets the terms of reference within which all further coverage or debate takes place.” (Hall 
et al. 1978, p. 58).  
In other words, primary definers tend to have the opportunity to frame a story or political question 
into narrow parameters before the debate begins. They do so by curating and supplying information 
as readymade as possible for journalists – for instance by scheduling press conference and by writing 
press releases in assessable language (Herman & Chomsky 1988) as well as by presenting and 
discussing their arguments via social media (Anstead & Chadwick 2018).  
Primary definers tend to come from organisations of the already-powerful, such as organised interest 
groups, government departments, political parties or corporations (Anstead & Chadwick 2018; 
Herman & Chomsky 1988; Murdock 1982). On the individual level, intellectuals can act as primary 
definers with significant agenda-setting power (Becker 2002). First discussed by Gramsci in his Prison 
Notebooks, intellectuals typically perceive themselves as neutral and autonomous from class-based 
interests; yet, often they are not. In contrast, for Gramsci intellectuals are closely connected to 
different social groups as they provide awareness and (internal) coherence. Moreover, intellectuals 
play a central role in the political economy as they function as “the dominant group's ‘deputies’ 
exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government” (Gramsci 
1971/2003, p. 118). They are key in the legitimation of class-based interests and their dissemination 
into society as well as in winning the active and passive consent of other class fractions. 
Recent empirical literature on the role of organisations and intellectuals as primary definers 
reinforces the significance of filter three. Berry (2013), for instance, analyses the coverage of the 
banking crisis on BBC Radio 4’s flagship news and current affairs show in 2008 and reveals that 
representatives from the financial services community were by far the most dominant group in the 
news reporting (see also Knowles et al. 2017). Likewise, empirical analyses of the "age of austerity"
signify the agenda-setting function of primary definers in the media to redirect the blame for the 
crisis away from bankers and the banking sector, and towards the state (Mullen 2018; Berry 2016).7
7 Recent developments – often subsumed as media crisis or transformation of media – further amplifies the 
relevance of institutionalised organisations as primary definers. Within increasingly competitive news 
environments, shrinking resources and accelerating time constraints, journalists tend to rely even more on 
readymade information provided by large organisations such as government departments, corporations and 
organised interest groups (Grabner und Grisold 2018; Balčytienė et al. 2015; Strömbäck & Karlsson 2011; 
Hanitzsch et al. 2010). 
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4. Methodology 
This study employs text mining methods and corpus linguistics in the framework of critical discourse 
studies (Subtirelu & Baker 2017; Mautner 1995) in order to examine the print media coverage of 
wealth and inheritance taxation between 2000 and 2018. This section explains and discusses the data 
built for and used in this study and the text mining and network analysis methods. 
A corpus of print media articles was collected based on the daily newspapers Süddeutsche Zeitung 
("SZ"), taz, Die Welt and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (“FAZ”) as well as the weekly newspapers Die 
Zeit, Der Spiegel and Welt am Sonntag (“WaS”). These are among the most influential and most read 
quality newspapers in Germany over the entire period (Röper 2018, 2014, 2008, 2004, 2000). Several 
newspapers in the sample are considered a Leitmedium (‘newspaper of record’). A Leitmedium sets 
and influences social, political and economic debates on current affairs.8 Concerning ownership, most 
of the newspapers belong to established publishing houses in Germany: Süddeutsche Zeitung is part 
of Südwestdeutsche Medien Holding, Die Welt and Welt am Sonntag belong to Axel Springer SE, Die 
Zeit is part of Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck and Der Spiegel9 is partly owned by the media 
corporation Gruner+Jahr – all of which are among the ten largest media corporations in Germany 
(Ferschli et al. forthcoming). Except for Südwestdeutsche Medien Holding, all of those media 
corporations are held by large-scale, multi-generational family businesses (see Ferschli et al. 
forthcoming for details). This ownership might imply that said corporations have a vested interest in 
hostile media coverage of wealth and inheritance taxation. Two newspapers have a distinctly 
different legal structure: taz and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung belong to non-profit foundations 
(Bergmann & Novy 2012).  
Table 1: absolute and relative number of articles per newspaper in the corpus 
Newspaper No. of articles per cent of total articles
Der Spiegel 431 4 %
Süddeutsche Zeitung 2944 30 %
taz 1580 16 %
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1077 11 %
Welt am Sonntag 703 7 %
Die Welt 2332 2.4 % 
DIE ZEIT 644 0.7 % 
Total 9711 100
The newspaper articles were obtained from several databases (Lexis Nexis, factiva, and WISO) using 
appropriate keywords10 and with kind support from Alexander Leipold (forthcoming, 2016). After 
8 More specifically, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Zeit are 
considered Leitmedien (Pfanner 2011; Weischenberg 2005). 
9 Der Spiegel is owned by Gruner+Jahr, Spiegel-Mitarbeiter KG, a company owned by the Der Spiegel staff, as 
well as the heirs of Rudolf Augstein (kek 2019). 
10 The keywords used to identify the relevant newspaper articles for this study were: Vermögenssteuer or 
Vermögensteuer or Vermögensbesteuerung or Vermögenbesteuerung or Vermögensabgabe or 
Vermögenabgabe or Reichensteuer or Erbschaftssteuer or Erbschaftsteuer or Erbschaftsbesteuerung or 
Erbschaftbesteuerung or Erbschaftsabgabe or Erbschaftabgabe or Reichenabgabe or Reichenbesteuerung.  
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deleting unsuitable articles from the sample11, the final corpus consisted of 9711 articles (see table 
1). Apart from the articles’ headlines, lead paragraphs and main content, the corpus entails 
information on the authors, publication date and length of the articles. 
In order to analyse the role of organisations as primary definers in the print media coverage of 
wealth and inheritance taxation (see section 3), a comprehensive list of organisations has been 
collected. Initial data was kindly provided by Stefan Pühringer, which contains an extensive list of 
various organisations in Germany (Ötsch et al. 2018; Pühringer 2020 for details on the methodology). 
This data was reorganised and further extended for the specific focus of this article12, drawing on a 
list of German associations (Verbände) (Deutsches Verbände Forum 2019), as well as an official list of 
associations and lobby groups registered with the German parliament (Deutscher Bundestag 2019). 
Furthermore, all political parties in the Federal parliament during the relevant election periods were 
included. Finally, all corporations listed in the German stock indexes (DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX) 
as well as a list of family-owned companies are included in the list of organisations.13
Table 2: type of organisations included in this study 
Type of organisations No. of organisations
Private foundations/think tanks 69
Employers' associations 142
Political parties 12





Organised interest groups were classified into seven categories drawing on Dür & Mateo (2013) and 
Berry (1977). The final corpus lists 1095 organisations (see table 2). For appropriate organisations 
such as political parties, employee and employers’ associations as well as advocatory think tanks and 
private foundations, the stance on inheritance and wealth taxation was investigated based on 
organisations’ publications and press releases. For the network analysis of organisations (see below 
for details on the method) interrelations between the different organisations need to be established. 
In this study, organisations are considered interrelated if they share common members or if they are 
part of the same network of organisations. In order to establish interrelations, a comprehensive list 
of members and interest group networks was collected based on organisations’ websites and 
information obtained from previous research on organised interests (Lobbycontrol 2019; Fischer & 
Plehwe 2017; Deckwirth 2016; Plehwe et al. 2016).  
11 A combination of automatic and manual text cleaning methods were used to remove duplicate, corrected 
and very short articles. Further, internal memos („Hausmitteilungen“), letters from readers, tables of content, 
advertisement, book suggestions and event recommendations were excluded from the corpus. 
12 The corpus of organisations was compiled partly based on literature, which examines the role of organised 
interest groups to influence tax policies (Emmenegger and Marx 2019; Gilens and Page 2014; Hacker and 
Pierson 2010). Additionally, literature on the German situation was consulted, which emphasises the role of 
social partnership interest groups, which used to have superior influence on economic policy in the post-war 
‘German model’, and, more recently, the emerging advocatory think tanks (Thunert 2008; Friedman 2000; 
Mahnkopf 1999; Jessop 1989; Haeusler & Hirsch 1989). 
13 The list of corporations was compiled using the following sources: Institut für Familienunternehmen (2018) 
as well as various lists from boerse.de (o.J. a,b), Deutsche Börse (o.J. a,b,c,d) and Finanzen.net (o.J. a,b). 
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As discussed in section 3, intellectuals play an important role as primary definers. In this study, 
economists are considered the main type of primary definers on the individual level. The initial data, 
again kindly provided by Stefan Pühringer, consisted of all economists holding a professorship at a 
university in Germany in the 21st Century (see Grimm et al. 2018 for details). In order to obtain a 
larger sample of economists beyond economic professors, this data was updated and extended by 
including members of various academic associations in Germany (such as Keynes Gesellschaft, Verein 
für Socialpolitik and Kronberger Kreis) as well as a comprehensive list of German economists active 
on Twitter compiled by Makronom (Odendahl & Stachelsky 2019). Finally, well-known international 
economists were added to the sample based on own previous research. Economists were grouped 
according to their paradigmatic orientation based on professional websites, publicly available CVs 
and by consulting previous research on this matter (Grimm et al. 2018; Ötsch et al. 2018; Heise et al. 
2016; Heise & Thieme 2016). They were grouped according to the following categories: ordoliberals 
and other mainstream economists, plural mainstream economists, post-Keynesians and other 
heterodox economists. In total, this resulted in a list of 1423 economists.  
Concerning specific methods, text mining techniques and corpus linguistics from critical discourse 
studies are used to analysis the headlines, lead paragraphs and main texts of the newspaper articles 
(Subtirelu & Baker 2017; Mautner 1995). Following standard practices in textual analysis, stop-words 
(e.g. “the”, “and”, “or”), quotation marks and punctuations were removed in order to improve the 
quality and homogeneity of the data. Word, bigram and three-gram frequency lists were calculated 
in order to see at first glance what frequent words and word combinations occur in the newspaper 
articles (Silge & Robinson 2017). Bigrams are sequences of two adjacent words; tree-grams are three 
words next to each other. Frequently used words and word combinations can tell us much about the 
general direction of a debate. Words can trigger different images and assumptions, which are often 
“implicit, and appear to be a constant, shared, and natural feature of the world” (Stubbs 2003, p.
312). Selected keywords are subject to an in-depth analysis based on ‘KWIC’ concordances. KWIC 
(“keywords-in-context”) concordances display textual data in such a way that the keyword is shown 
within its textual environment, usually in the middle of the line (Mautner 2015; Mautner 1995). The 
KWIC concordances enable researchers to investigate what kind of words surround a specific 
keyword. Organisations and economists were searched for in headlines, lead paragraphs and main 
texts of the newspaper articles by drawing on pattern matching functions.
Previous research highlights that organisations are interrelated and typically share certain 
connections such as common members and interest group networks. In order to examine the 
interrelationships between different organisations, networks were calculated based on social 
network analysis (Sadler 2017; Luke 2015). The basic logic of this approach is to treat each 
organisation as one node in the network and each edge between the nodes as a connection of the 
organisation. The more connections between organisations exist, the higher the weight of the edge. 
In the network graphs, which are presented in the results section, this is illustrated through an 
increased thickness of the edges. The nodes size is ranked according to the frequency of occurrence 
in the newspaper articles.  
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5. Coverage of wealth and inheritance taxation 
The long-term coverage of wealth taxation in the German media over the entire period (2000 to 
2018) is displayed in figure 1. Figure 1a (upper part) shows the absolute number of articles; figure 1b 
(lower part) displays the relative number of articles (that is the number of articles on wealth and 
inheritance taxation divided by the total number of articles per year). 
Figure 1: absolute and relative number of articles per newspaper (2000 – 2018) 
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The first attention-drawing feature is that, over the entire time period, the coverage remains stable 
(fig. 1a) with several substantial fluctuations. In almost all newspapers, the absolute number of 
articles on inheritance and wealth taxation in the years 2000 and 2001 is roughly the same as in 2017 
and 2018. On average, about 540 articles are published per year. Given the number of seven 
newspapers in the sample, this is a lot less than 100 articles per newspaper per year. The relative 
number of articles (fig. 1b), also signify the rather small amount of coverage of this issue as only 
between 0.02 per cent and 0.06 per cent of all articles in the respective newspapers are on wealth 
and inheritance taxation. Related issues such as poverty or social justice are covered more frequently 
in the German press, with 1 per cent and 3 per cent respectively (Schröder & Vietze 2015). 
Over the entire time period, the relative number of articles slightly increased. This is due to an 
overall decrease in annually published articles in all newspapers apart from Die Zeit.14 In contrast to 
the absolute number of articles, figure 1b shows that the two weekly newspaper Der Spiegel and Die 
Zeit devote comparatively more articles to wealth and inheritance taxation, while Welt am Sonntag 
places less emphasis on such topics. For the daily newspapers (Süddeutsche Zeitung, taz and Die 
Welt) there is no such clear pattern: Die Welt and SZ alternate in which newspaper publishes more 
articles. Interestingly, taz (the most left-wing newspaper in the sample) publishes comparatively little 
on such issues in relative terms. 
Both fig. 1a and 1b, demonstrate that the coverage is subject to substantial fluctuations over time. 
Starting from relatively low levels, there are clear peaks in the coverage, both in absolute and 
relative terms. Süddeutsche Zeitung, for example, only published about 50 articles on wealth and 
inheritance taxation in 2000 and 2001, which increased to around 170 articles in 2002 and even more 
so to over 200 in the years 2007 to 2009. Following this, absolute numbers decreased again in the 
years 2010 to 2018, with two one-off spikes occurring in 2013 and 2016. Several other newspapers 
display quite similar trends in their coverage. 
An analysis of the frequent words, bigrams and trigrams (appendix A.2 and A.3) indicates that 
inheritance taxation is at the centre of the media coverage: ‘reform der erbschaftsteuer’15, 
‘erbschaftsteuer’ and ‘bei der erbschaftsteuer’ are high up on the frequency lists. In contrast, wealth 
taxation is less frequently featured by the media coverage, as ‘vermögensteuer’ and 
‘wiedereinführung der vermögensteuer’ are further down the lists. Moreover, many policy-related 
words are prominent on the frequency lists such as politicians (kanzlerin angela merkel, oskar 
lafontaine, bundesfinanzminister peer steinbrück, frankwalter steinmeier) as well as political parties 
and governing coalitions (spd, union, union und spd, großen koalition, csu, union und fdp). The 
corpus of articles seems to feature a semi-frequent debate around economic inequality related to 
the taxation of wealth and inheritance signified by the keywords ‘arm und reich’, ‘reichensteuer’, 
‘soziale gerechtigkeit’ and ‘hartz iv’. The semi-frequent occurrence of corporation-related words such 
as ‘firmenerben’, ‘unternehmen’ and ‘deutsch industrie’ signify the business context of the wealth 
and inheritance taxation. 
14 Over the entire time span, all newspapers except for Die Zeit publish a decreasing number of articles per 
year. In some newspapers such as Die Welt and taz, the total number of articles has decreased by almost 50 
per cent. 
15  In the empirical part, all citations in single quotes are taken from the empirical corpus. For the cause of 
readability, I refrain from applying the German capitalization rules.  
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In the next step, several keywords of interest are investigated by the KWIC-concordance analysis (an 
example of three-word occurrences for the keyword ‘inheritance taxation’ is provided in appendix 
A.4). A close examination of re-occurring nouns, verbs and adjectives in close proximity to the 
keywords ‘inheritance taxation’ and ‘wealth taxation’ show a repeated pattern of ‘reform’, 
‘bundesverfassungsgericht’, ‘neuregelung’, ‘reformieren’ and ‘verfassungswidrig’. This suggests that 
the constitutional court rulings in 2008 and 2014 as well as the subsequent reform processes (see 
section 2) are important drivers of the coverage.  
Regarding the keyword ‘unternehmen’, the frequently surrounding words ‘klein’, ‘mittlere’, 
‘mittelständisch’ and ‘mittelstand’ point towards small and medium-sized companies being 
predominantly in the foreground of the coverage. Whilst small and medium-sized companies are 
often presented as the backbone of the German economy and the hidden champions of the export-
led growth model, many of them have actually outgrown any traditional measure of medium size in 
past decades (Lehrer & Schmid 2015). In particular ‘mittelstand’ connotes a rather positive image of 
corporations, suggesting a business conducted with personal touch and an ethos of high traditional 
business standards: “The Mittelstand denotes that special class of firms that are not soul-less [sic] 
functional entities, that are not publicly traded firms and that are most especially not mere ‘money-
making machines’ dominated by the profit motive alone” (Lehrer & Schmid 2015, p. 304). 
Furthermore, the frequent reference to ‘arbeitsplätze’, ‘investieren’, ‘deutschland’, ‘weniger’, 
‘beschäftigten’, ‘mitarbeiter’, ‘entlasten’ in relation to corporations are a sign of a coverage which 
emphasises the business interests in relation to inheritance and wealth taxation.  
An analysis of the frequent words in proximity to the keywords ‘gerechtigkeit’ and ‘ungleichheit’
reveals that a debate around restoring social justice and reducing economic inequality is tied to the 
coverage of wealth and inheritance taxation - although quantitatively this only happens to limited 
extents. Words such as ‘sorgen’, ‘solidarität’, ‘chancengleichheit’, ‘demokratie’, ‘gleichheit’ signify 
the social justice claims pursued in the context of the coverage.  
In line with previous research (Grisold & Theine forthcoming), newspaper articles on wealth and 
inheritance taxation appear to ascribe an ambivalent role to the state. On the one hand, the state’s 
basic function to provide public goods financed by taxation is acknowledged. For instance, frequent 
words surrounding the keyword ‘staat’ are: ‘einnahmen’, ‘finanzieren, ‘gesellschaft’, ‘sozial’ and 
‘handlungsfähigen’, which points to the active and supporting role of the state. On the other, a more 
hostile stance towards the role of the state is evident. This is signified by the frequent word 
‘schulden’, used in the context of the state only making use of additional revenue from wealth 
taxation to reduce its debts. Moreover, taxation is characterised as a cohesive measure (‘zwang’, 
‘zwangsmaßnahme’), combined with the demand for a small government (‘schlanker staat’) that 
should not interfere with private wealth. 
In order to further investigate the fluctuation in the coverage, such time periods with intensive 
coverage are displayed in figure 2. Furthermore, articles during these times periods are subject to a 
word, bigram and trigram frequency analysis (see appendix A.5 to A.8). 
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Figure 2: absolute number of newspaper articles in four periods (01/2002 to 12/2004, 01/2006 to 
12/2009, 01/2011 to 12/2013 and 06/2014 to 12/2017) 
A closer inspection of the first time period (01/2002 to 06/2004) reveals that the time period 
between August 2002 and January 2003 (see grey area in fig.2) is subject to increased coverage with 
30 to 60 articles being published in the different newspapers on wealth and inheritance taxation. In 
contrast, the other months display relatively little overall coverage. The word frequency list of the 
headlines and lead paragraphs of articles published between August and December 2002 (appendix 
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A.5) reveals that wealth taxation has been in the focus during this period, as ‘vermögensteuer’ is the 
most frequent word in those months. Furthermore, several policy area-related words, bigram and 
trigrams occur frequently such as: ‘rotgrün’, ‘spd’, ‘regierung’ and ‘nach der bundestagswahl’. The 
lists frequently mention several leaders of Federal German states (niedersachsens ministerpräsident 
sigmar, ministerpräsident roland koch, edmund stoiber, wolfgang clement) and politicians on the 
federal level (kanzler schröder, fraktionschef müntefering). Furthermore, several word combinations 
hint towards heated controversy: ‘streit um die’, ‘kanzler umkurvt vermögensteuer’, ‘schröder 
spricht machtwort’, ‘verdi droht’. Taken together, the frequency lists shows that the coverage is 
centred most likely on debate and controversy in the political arena among different actors and on 
different levels.  
In the second time period (01/2007 to 12/2009) the coverage of wealth and inheritance taxation is 
particularly intense in Süddeutsche Zeitung between May 2008 and January 2009 (see grey area in 
fig.2), with 40 to 60 articles being published per month. The word frequency list (appendix A.6) 
shows that the coverage centres on the inheritance taxation, as ‘erbschaftsteuer’ is the second most 
frequent word during those months. Again, the many policy area-related words and word 
combinations are frequently used (spd, union, große koalition, horst seehofer, bundeskanzlerin 
angela merkel), though they are different ones in comparison to the first time period. Furthermore, 
the political reform process taking place at the time is a major driver of increased coverage, as 
‘reform der erbschaftsteuer’ is the most frequent three-word combination throughout May 2008 to 
February 2009.16
The third period (01/2012 to 12/2013) is not characterised by a few months of intensive coverage, 
but rather by two entire years of relatively high coverage. In contrast to the three other periods, 
there is not one peak in the coverage but rather several months of medium-high coverage between 
August 2012 and October 2013. The word frequency list of the headlines and lead paragraphs of 
articles published between those 14 month (August 2012 and October 2013) reveals that both 
inheritance and wealth taxation are discussed, as they each come up as frequently used words (see 
appendix A.7). Apart from Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democrats (Union), Greens (Bündnis 
90/ Die Grünen) are among the most frequently mentioned parties (grün/grüne), probably due to 
their announcement to re-introduce wealth taxation (wiedereinführung der vermögensteuer) as part 
of their federal election manifesto in 2013 (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-
Württemberg 2013). The list of most frequent bigrams and trigrams further implies that the issue of 
wealth taxation might be frequently linked to the political reform process in France: François 
Hollande re-introduced wealth taxation in 2012, which was controversially debated and (among 
others) led the actor Gérard Depardieu to renounce his French citizenship in order to avoid taxation 
(Clift & McDaniel 2017; Süddeutsche Zeitung 2013).  
During the fourth period (06/2014 to 04/2017), there is oncemore a peak in coverage between 
February and November 2016 (see grey area in fig.2), where the coverage increased from a handful 
16 Indeed, in the second half of 2008 the governing coalition (SPD and CDU/CSU) tried to reach an agreement 
on the necessity to reform the inheritance taxation, with diverging positions becoming apparent in particular 
between SPD and CSU. An agreement was reached at the end of the year 2008; the reformed act passed the 
Bundestag on 24th December, only a few days before reaching the deadline set by the constitutional court. In 
this context, figure 2 seems to suggest that in particular Süddeutsche Zeitung covered those political 
developments most frequently (Gammelin 2017). 
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to over 20 articles per month. The word, bigram and trigram frequency lists show a debate being 
centred on the inheritance taxation, as ‘erbschaftsteuer’, ‘reform der erbschaftsteuer’ and 
‘neuregelung der erbschaftsteuer’ constitute some of the most frequently used words and word 
combinations (appendix A.8). Furthermore, the frequent words ‘streit’, ‘kompromiss’ and ‘im streit 
um’ indicate that the coverage is centred on the dispute and efforts to find compromises in those 
months, where the governing coalition between SPD and CDU/CSU as well as the governing 
politicians of the Federal states were struggling to reach an agreement over the reform of the 
inheritance taxation.  
Recalling the function of the media to diffuse symbols and images into the public (section 3), the 
present findings signify that wealth and inheritance taxation is a non-frequent topic in the German 
print media. When reported it is presented and discussed with a focus on the political processes and 
negotiations. The ‘odds and ends of politics’ and the political posturing clearly dominate the news 
coverage.  
6. The role of primary definers in the coverage of wealth and inheritance 
taxation 
The following section discusses the role of organisations and economists as primary definers in the 
newspaper coverage on wealth and inheritance taxation. 
Table 4 displays the newspaper coverage of the various organisations over the entire period, both in 
absolute terms (the column “sum” lists the absolute number of occurrences of the types of 
organisations) and relative terms (reference of organisations in individual newspapers is displayed in 
relative terms per newspaper. At first glance, table 4 suggests that the types of organisations are 
mentioned at significantly different frequencies: some organisations, such as research institutes, 
universities or private foundations and think tanks, are mentioned around 800 times in newspaper 
articles. Others are mentioned to much higher levels, such as political parties, which are referred to 
over 15,000 times in total.17 The frequent reference to political parties and government organisations 
further amplifies that the coverage of wealth and inheritance taxation is very much centred on the 
political process and the activities of various political actors. Furthermore, table 4 shows that Der 
Spiegel and FAZ refer to organisations most frequently. In contrast, Süddeutsche Zeitung and taz
refer less to organisations in comparison to the other newspapers (see the different colours in table 
4). 
17 Table A.9 (appendix) lists the twenty most frequently referenced organisations and indicates that the largest 
political parties (SPD, CDU/CSU, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, FDP and Die Linke) are among the most mentioned 
ones. Furthermore, the government organisations Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
Bundeskanzleramt, and Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie are high up on the list. Among the trade 
unions, Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft and Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund were most frequently 
mentioned, while Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie received most attention representing the side of the 
employee associations. 
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Table 4: newspaper coverage of organisations relative to the number of newspaper articles (yellow = 
relatively high coverage; grey = relatively low coverage; sum = absolute number) 
Type of organisation Zeit Spiegel Welt faz SZ WaS taz sum
Research institutes/ 
universities
0.120 0.188 0.067 0.127 0.054 0.107 0.067 793
Government 0.904 1.578 0.953 0.968 0.806 0.899 0.599 8480
Private foundations/ think 
tanks
0.107 0.081 0.089 0.113 0.064 0.114 0.104 867
Corporations 0.578 0.780 0.226 0.256 0.222 0.377 0.201 2748
Political parties 1.455 2.346 1.667 1.852 1.364 1.814 1.786 15943
Employers' associations 0.061 0.077 0.124 0.143 0.075 0.118 0.027 860
Trade unions/ welfare 
organisations
0.132 0.218 0.138 0.216 0.094 0.131 0.175 1380
Turning to the analysis of the organisations with the help of social network analysis, figure 3 indicates 
the network of organisations. A key feature of the organisation network is the structure of the 
network itself, with two opposing network cores (see appendix A.10 for a full list of organisation 
names). Core 1 compounds three different types of social-democratic and left-wing organisations: 
political parties such as the Greens, the Left Party (Die Linke), and the Social Democatic Party, 
foundations and think tanks such as the Rosa-Luxemburg Stiftung, Institut für solidarische Moderne 
(ISM) and Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung as well as trade unions such as Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), 
Ver.di and Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall).
Core 2 consists of market-liberal and conservative organisations from three different types: political 
parties such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU), Free Democratic Party (FDP) and 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), foundations and think tanks such as Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (No. 
20), Friedrich Naumann Stiftung für die Freiheit (No. 9), Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (No. 
12), Ludwig Erhard-Stiftung (No. 15), Stiftung Marktwirtschaft (No. 19), Stiftung 
Familienunternehmen (No. 18), as well as employee associations such as Arbeitgeberverband 
Gesamtmetall (AG Metall), Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) and Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Arbeitgeber (BDA). Core 2 has many links between the different organisations which is 
signified by the thickness of the edges, i.e. the connecting lines between the different organisations. 
Furthermore, several of the organisations in core 2 are frequently mentioned in the newspaper 
articles. This is highlighted by the nodes’ size, i.e. the size of the points. 
The network graph reveals that foundations and think tanks play a major role. They connect many of 
the other organisations, illustrated by their centrality within the two cores and the number of edges 
they are related to. The closeness of core 1 seems to be driven in particular by foundations and think 
tanks as there are several ones with a large number of thick edges right at the centre (Initiative Neue 
Soziale Marktwirtschaft (No. 12), Ludwig Erhard-Stiftung (No. 15), Stiftung Marktwirtschaft (No. 19), 
Stiftung Familienunternehmen (No. 18), Eucken-Institut (No. 6), Hayek Gesellschaft (No. 7), Institut 
der deutschen Wirtschaft (IdW).18
18 Additionally, figure 3 indicates that core 1 and core 2 are not entirely independent from each other but share 
several connections. A closer analysis of such connections highlights that several people are members in 
foundations, political parties and think tanks from both cores. Among them for instance Sigmar Mosdorf 
(former) member of German parliament for the SPD, member of the advisory board of the Friedrich Ebert 
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Figure 3: network of organisations (2000- 2018)19
Note that the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) as part of core 2 holds 
numerous connections to private foundations and think tanks such as Hayek Gesellschaft, Initiative 
Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft and Ludwig Erhard-Stiftung. This reflects the ideological affinity of the 
AfD to market-liberal thinking, which is shared with other organisations of core 2.20
Considering the stance of the organisations, table A.11 (appendix) signifies that those organisations 
hostile to a reintroduction of wealth taxation and to an increase of inheritance tax are mentioned 
most in the overall newspaper coverage. Among them are the conservative, market-liberal and right-
wing/ populist parties (CDU/CSU, FDP and AfD) as well as many of the think tanks and employers' 
associations that are also part of core 2. The second most frequently mentioned group of 
Stiftung (both core 1) and also member of the advisory board of Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung and (former) Initiative 
Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (both core 2).  
19 Nodes are coloured based on the type of the organisations (grey = political parties; turquoise = foundations 
and think tanks; red = employee associations; green = trade unions and welfare organisations).
20 Many economists close to ordoliberal thinking were among the founders of the AfD in 2013 (such as Bernd 
Lucke, Joachim Starbatty or Hans-Olaf Henkel). Even though many ordoliberalists left the party in 2015 and the 
subsequent years, the AfD has not departed from ordoliberalism, as recent statements of party leaders and 




organisations are those with an unclear stance towards wealth and inheritance taxation. Among 
them are the SPD and several political foundations (such as Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung or Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung) that do not take an explicit or varying stance towards wealth and inheritance 
taxation. Those organisations that support a re-introduction of the wealth tax and an increase of the 
inheritance tax are the third most cited group. Among them are Die Linke, several trade unions and 
think tanks such as attac.  
As stated above, research institutes and universities are mentioned only to a limited extent in the 
newspaper articles in comparison to other organisations. In order to further investigate this pattern, 
the remainder of this section analyses the reference to economists, many of whom are affiliated to 
research institutes and universities. 







FAZ SZ WaS taz sum
Thomas Piketty 14 7 5 16 21 6 14 83
Clemens Fuest 8 3 8 11 7 5 1 43
Hans-Werner Sinn 4 5 8 8 10 3 3 41
Stefan Bach 2 0 4 5 16 1 13 41
Peter Bofinger 4 4 4 3 9 2 8 34
Rudolf Hickel 0 2 0 4 7 1 15 29
Michael Hüther 1 0 11 5 4 6 0 27
Marcel Fratzscher 4 1 4 4 4 2 5 24
Joseph E. Stiglitz 3 2 2 2 6 1 6 22
Paul Krugman 6 3 0 2 7 1 3 22
Lars Feld 2 1 3 5 4 2 1 18
Thomas Straubhaar 2 1 4 0 3 5 1 16
Christoph Butterwegge 0 0 1 0 4 0 10 15
Friedrich Heinemann 2 0 2 2 7 1 0 14
Gustav A. Horn 5 0 2 1 3 1 2 14
Christoph M. Schmidt 2 0 1 2 2 2 4 13
Dierk Hirschel 3 0 0 0 4 0 6 13
Kenneth Rogoff 1 3 3 2 3 0 1 13
Wolfgang Franz 0 0 4 1 5 1 2 13
Stefan Homburg 0 1 2 4 2 2 0 11
Table 5 displays the most frequently mentioned economists in the newspaper coverage – all being 
male. At first glance, it shows that several international experts are among the twenty most cited 
economists, such as Joseph E. Stiglitz, Paul Krugman and Kenneth Rogoff. Thomas Piketty is 
mentioned the most in overall terms. Moreover, several well-known German economists feature in 
the list, some of them being identified by previous research as important sources in media debates 
on economic issues (FAZ 2018; Butz & Wohlrabe 2016; Pühringer & Hirte 2015; Wohlrabe 2014). 
Among them are, for instance, Clemens Fuest – president of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research 
since 2016 –, as well as his long-standing predecessor Hans-Werner Sinn. Likewise, several current 
and former members of the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur 
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Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung) are on the list, such as Peter Bofinger, Lars 
Feld, Wolfgang Franz and Christoph M. Schmidt.  
Table A.12 (appendix) lists the occurrence of economists grouped according to their paradigmatic 
orientation (see section 4 for details on the methodology). Economists associated with mainstream 
economics are by far the largest group in the newspaper coverage, followed by pluralist mainstream 
economists and ordoliberalists. Much less frequently occurring are post-Keynesian economists and 
other heterodox economists. A closer look into the categories reveals that many of the most-cited 
pluralist mainstream economists are in fact Thomas Piketty and his colleagues and co-authors (for 
instance Emanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman). When only German and German-based economists are 
considered, ordoliberalists make up a large majority of economists in the media coverage. 
Such findings are broadly in line with previous research on German economists and their influence 
on economic policies and socio-political debates. Although only a small fraction of German 
economists are engaged in the ordoliberal research program, they play a major role in the policy 
advice institutions and for designing economic policies. In contrast, post-Keynesian and heterodox 
economists are typically in much less influential positions (Ötsch et al. 2018; Grimm et al. 2018; 
Botzem & Hesselmann 2018). Recalling the argument put forward by Gramsci that intellectuals (in 
this case: economists) play a major role in the political economy as they legitimate and disseminate 
class-based interest, the imbalance between ordoliberal and other mainstream economists, on the 
one hand, and post-Keynesian and other heterodox economists, on the other hand, signifies a 
dominance of market liberal positions over interventionist agendas. 
Yet, individual economists play a much smaller role in the newspaper coverage, compared to the 
overall number of organisations mentioned. One possible interpretation for this pattern is that the 
issue of wealth and inheritance taxation (and more broadly economic inequality) has been largely 
absent from mainstream and ordoliberal thinking in the German-speaking area for some time (Ptak 
2006; Foucault 2017, ch. 5 to 7). Hence, German economists do not appear frequently in the 
newspaper coverage due to their lack of interest and expertise in the topic. This interpretation is 
further amplified by the observation that several international economists such as Thomas Piketty 
are cited frequently.  
Reconsidering the media as an ideological arena for primary definers, the present findings shows that 
market-liberal and conservative organisations dominate the news over social-democratic and left-
wing organisations which hints to the primacy of positions which discard a reintroduction of wealth 
taxation and reject the increase of the inheritance taxation. 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper can be seen in a threefold way. First, it demonstrates that over the 21st
century so far (2000 to 2018) wealth and inheritance taxation comprises a non-frequent topic in the 
German print media. A rather small number of newspaper covers the topic, which in relative terms is 
only about 0.02 to 0.06 per cent of all articles. Only short periods (of a few months) contain a more 
intensive reporting. Given the urgency and gravity of the topic as suggested by several social 
scientists such as Krugman (2017) or Stiglitz (2019), this is a striking fact. 
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Secondly, wealth and inheritance taxation are predominantly reported as a political matter centring 
on the reform process of the inheritance taxation as well as the political debates, disputes and 
struggles to find compromise between different political actors, which is exposed by frequent words, 
word combinations and KWIC concordances. The predominant focus on political debates fades out 
other possible aspects and functions of wealth and inheritance taxation: the analysed corpus neither 
discusses the potential positive impact on public finances of redistributing property and wealth, nor 
does it focus on the increasingly needed disruption of the growing power and influence of the rich 
that these taxations would facilitate. Finally, and above all, it also does not focus on wealth and 
inheritance taxation as a means to partially restore social justice and fairness in a highly unequal 
society. 
Finally, an analysis of organisations and economists as primary definers highlights that market-liberal 
and conservative positions dominate over social-democratic and left-wing ones. An examination of 
the networks of key organisations reveals that the market-liberal and conservative core is highly 
interconnected with several market-liberal think thanks at the centre. Overall, the findings hint to a 
hostile news coverage to the re-introduction of wealth taxation and the increase of inheritance 
taxation in Germany. 
What does this tell us about the role of the media? The findings suggest that while there is some 
debate around the viability of higher taxation, there is a predominance of a market-liberal stance, 
which seems to be largely adopted by the media as default assumption and overarching ideology. In 
line with previous research (for instance Preston & Silke 2011; Grisold & Theine forthcoming), this 
contribution lays bare the critical role of the media which tends to normalise and reinforce current 
social orders of economic inequalities while marginalising the oppressed and disadvantaged. 
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APPENDIX 
Tab. A.1: Summary of main points regarding inheritance taxation 
Source: own summary bases on (Butterwegge 2018; Dorn et al. 2017; Horn et al 2017; Ministery of Finance 
2017; Bach 2016, 2015; Bach & Mertz 2016; Scholz & Truger 2016a; BVerfG 2014, 2006; Maiterth 2013; Houben 
& Maiterth 2011) 
Event Summary of main points regarding inheritance taxation
Tax reform 1993 & 1996 - Tax exemption granted bequeathed businesses (sole proprietorships, 
partnerships and substantial shareholding [> 25%] in corporations) the following 
privileges: average tax value of businesses were assessed 30 to 50 per cent 
below market value; the bequest of businesses were granted special tax 
allowances of 225,000 euros as well as assessing the remainder only with 65% in 
case the business is not sold in the following five years.
ruling of the 
constitutional court 
(November 7th, 2006)
- Treatment of business property under the German inheritance tax law is 
partially unconstitutional, due to the tax exemptions granted for the bequest of 
businesses.
- In principle, business assets can be granted certain exemptions from 
inheritance taxation in order to ensure the solvency of corporations according to 
the constitutional court, but regulations in place are much too far-reaching.
- Inheritance tax act had to be reformed by 31st of December 2008.
Tax reform
(24th of December 2008)
- After heated debate, the coalition between Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats reached an agreement only few days before the time limit set by the 
constitutional court.
- From 2009 onwards, business assets are assessed according to market value.
- Personal allowances for direct descendants and spouses are increased.
- Bequest of business assets could be exempted from taxation to 85 per cent or 
even entirely with no upper limit of the businesses value if the heir continues to 
operate the business
Ruling of the 
constitutional court 
(17th of December 2014)
- The constitutional court reinforced its ruling on the inheritance tax act as 
partially unconstitutional – again due to the tax exemptions granted for the 
bequest of businesses.
- Inheritance tax act had to be reformed by 30th of June 2016.
Tax reform
(9th November 2016)
- The coalition between Social Cemocrats and Christian Democrats together with 
the federal states (Bundesländer) reached an agreement in the parliament's 
mediation committee on 9th November 2016 (the biggest controversy, again, 
centred on tax reliefs for business assets)
- Exemptions from taxation to 85 or even 100 per cent remained effective for 
businesses up to a value of 26m euros; in some cases even up to 52m euros.
- The bequest of business assets of more than 26m euros is, in principle, subject 
to inheritance taxation unless the heir provides evidence that they are not able 
to pay the amount due ("Bedürfnisprüfung")
- Instead of the Bedürfnisprüfung, heirs can also opt for the ablation model 
("Abschmelzmodel"), which allows for postponement of inheritance or gift taxes 
on business assets for a period of ten years, along with a 10 per cent discharge 
of the taxes for each year the company continues to operate. 
- The valuation of business assets was adapted again, which resulted in a 
valuation below market value of up to 23 per cent. In fact, due to this regulation, 
medium-sized businesses might fall below the 26m euro threshold and, hence, 
below the Bedürfnisprüfung
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Tab. A.2: fifty most frequent words, bigrams and trigrams in headline and lead paragraph  
(2000 and 2018)
Frequent words n Frequent bigrams1
Frequent 





spd 2217 groß koalition 507 reform der erbschaftsteuer 292
erbschaftsteuer 1511 angela merkel 362 der groß koalition 211
groß 1324 peer steinbrück 246 union und spd 183
union 1169 horst seehofer 182 die groß koalition 165
deutsch 1141 sigmar gabriel 175 die reform der 130
koalition 1122 höher steuern 142 in der spd 100
deutschland 1071 gerhard schröder 123 bei der erbschaftsteuer 96
steuern 879 kuren beck 95 in den vergangen 88
reform 866 wolfgang schäuble 93 bundeskanzlerin angela merkel 87
erben 818 franz müntefering 90 vor all die 83
gut 759 steuern zahlen 89 arm und reich 77
csu 757 bundeskanzlerin angela 87 peer steinbrück spd 76
wenig 729 oskar lafontaine 83 von union und 74
regieren 721 sozial gerechtigkeit 83 union und fdp 69
grünen 719 steinbrück spd 78 bundesfinanzminister peer steinbrück 67
partei 685 nicolas sarkozy 77 cdu und csu 64
reichen 654 frankwalter steinmeier 74 spd und grün 64
geld 647 hartz iv 74 bund und länder 62
merkel 644 axel springer 70 in den usa 60
cdu 637 martin greive 69 streit um Die 60
milliarden 606 bundesfinanzminister peer 67 ein reform der 59
höher 599 hans eichel 67 in höhe von 59
zahlen 596 françois hollande 66 angela merkel cdu 57
grün 581 jürgen trittin 66 in der groß 57
fordern 557 martin schulz 65 finanzminister peer steinbrück 54
mögen 537 roland koch 61 kanzler angela merkel 54
politik 510 ulrich schulen 61 zwischen arm und 53
vermögenssteuer 491 merkel cdu 57 die einführen Ein 52
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Tab. A.2 (continued)





kanzler 487 geplant reform 56 die spd willst 48
sozial 481 erwin huber 55 von spd und 48
unternehm
en 475 kanzler angela 55 angela merkel und 47
fdp 465
finanzmini
ster peer 54 daniel friedrich sturm 47
reichensteu
er 458 emmanuel macron 53 ein groß koalition 47
stellen 453 andrea nahles 52 es ist ein 47
kommen 451 guido westerwelle 52 in der krise 46
münchen 443 stefan reinecke 49 wolfgang schäuble cdu 46
weit 433 daniel friedrich 47 heißen es in 45
millionen 423 friedrich sturm 47 geplant reform der 44
finanzminist
er 419 olaf scholz 47 in der koalition 44





ht 46 spd und grünen 41






politisch 398 peter ramsauer 44 für die spd 40
angela 387 paul kirchhof 42 auf den weg 39
erhöhen 378 thomas piketty 42 die zahl der 39
erbschaftste
uer 372 peter struck 41 in der union 39
geplant 372 barack obama 39 in kraft treten 39
lang 372 kasse bitten 39 spd und union 39
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Tab. A.3: fifty most frequent words, bigrams and trigrams in the main text  













spd 14851 groß koalition 2266 in den vergangen 1302
union 11984 angela merkel 1495 in der spd 877
groß 10484 gerhard schröder 1238 da ist ein 845
deutschlan
d 10163 sigmar gabriel 917 der groß koalition 779
deutsch 9437 peer steinbrück 867 die groß koalition 725
gut 8488 sozial
gerechtigk
eit 751 vor all die 723








geld 6679 steuern zahlen 528 in höhe von 624
partei 6555 hans eichel 503 in den letzte 593
erbschaftst
euer 6333 höher steuern 453 die zahl der 587
milliarden 6304 öffentlich dienst 436 union und spd 562
unternehm
en 6214 horst seehofer 435 auch in der 553
regieren 6169 darüber hinaus 433 es ist ein 544
politik 5799 oskar lafontaine 429 es in der 529
menschen 5577 wolfgang schäuble 425 die
wiedereinf
ührung der 523
sozial 5531 kuren beck 409 in den nächste 507
staat 5488 sozial
marktwirts
chaft 393 nach wie vor 501
steuern 5487 groß mögen 389 nicht nur die 496
müssen 5456 jürgen trittin 375 ein groß koalition 491
weit 5423 roland koch 368 heißen es in 489
mögen 5387 andrea nahles 367 die einführen ein 469
koalition 5268 frau merkel 356 bei der
erbschaftst
euer 465
kommen 5155 olaf scholz 323 in der partei 462
politisch 5135 edmund stoiber 306 mit blick auf 446
vermögesn
steuer 4992 rudolph augstein 304 in der regel 437
stellen 4951
frankwalte
r steinmeier 300 sich in der 427
hätte 4923 kalt
progressio
n 293 cdu und csu 414
zahlen 4808 wolfgang clement 291 reform der
erbschaftst
euer 410
millionen 4782 ig metall 290 ein erhöhen der 401
führen 4711 einigen staaten 289 für die spd 400
länder 4638
bundeskan
zler gerhard 283 die von der 396
erben 4626 martin schulz 276 nach der wahl 385
unser 4573 mittlere
einkomme
n 273 bund und länder 377
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Tab. A.3 (continued) 
fordern 4498 deutsch industrie 267 auch für die 373
höher 4475 milliarden dollar 241 blick auf die 371
merkel 4383 europäisch union 238 arm und reich 359
geben 4352 15 milliarden 237 in der schweiz 359
können 4330 rotgrün koalition 237 spd und grün 356
cdu 4323 guido
westerwell
e 236 union und fdp 347
eigen 4308 höher
erbschaftst
euer 235 in der politik 340
erhöhen 4260 erster linie 233 die reform der 335
liegen 4197
bundeskan
zlerin angela 232 da ist die 333
stehen 4153 routine general 230 mit der spd 332
reform 4072 unser
gesellschaf
t 226 vor der wahl 326
schröder 4027 helmut kohl 224 und in der 323
reichen 4012 erneuern energie 223 fordern nach ein 317
wichtig 3991 rollen spielen 222 die in der 316
deshalb 3958 deutlich höher 219 bei den grünen 314
lang 3866 cem özdemir 218 da ist nicht 312
Tab. A.4: Example of twenty KWIC-words 
Text 
No. pre keyword post
3 eine Erhöhung der Erbschaftsteuer zu finanzieren Aber
8 Teufel gegen höhere Erbschaftsteuer Stuttgartddp - Die
13 Scharfe Kontroverse über Erbschaftsteuer Berlin Im Streit
19 keine Erhöhung der Erbschaftsteuer geben Alle Beteiligten
39 SPDPolitiker fordern höhere Erbschaftsteuer Gerichte könnten Druck
50 vor der neuen Erbschaftsteuer Immobilienerwerber genießen Vertrauensschutz
72 Parteivorstand will die Erbschaftsteuer weiterentwickeln die Vermögensteuer
101 eigene Novelle der Erbschaftsteuer vorlegen um Personengesellschaften
102 10 Prozent der Erbschaftsteuer gestundet werden Nach
104 Entlastung bei der Erbschaftsteuer für kleine und
156 schrittweise Auslaufen der Erbschaftsteuer bis 2010 beschlossen
186 Die Reform der Erbschaftsteuer sei außerdem zu
187 Die Reform der Erbschaftsteuer ist beschlossene Sache
365 Belastung durch die Erbschaftsteuer einstellen müssen Diese
429 zur Reform der Erbschaftsteuer nützen Ehepartnern und
673 Firmen zu Kanzlerin Erbschaftsteuer wird deutlich verbessert
790 den Kompromiss zur Erbschaftsteuer auf den sich
814 CSU will die Erbschaftsteuer weiter reformieren sollte
909 erwägt Anpassung der Erbschaftsteuer Krise erschwert Einhaltung
1154 schlagen Alarm die Erbschaftsteuer vernichte Unternehmen Hier
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Tab. A.5: thirty most frequent words, bigrams and trigrams in headline and lead paragraph  












vermögensteuer 100 sigmar gabriel 18 im öffentlichen dienst 13
schröder 82 öffentlichen dienst 16 in der spd 11
spd 66 gerhard schröder 11
ministerpräs
ident sigmar gabriel 5
gabriel 48 höhere steuern 9 mit dem kanzler 5
kanzler 46 kanzler schröder 7 streit um die 5















ent 5 steuer auf vermögen 4
steuererhöhung
en 23 roland koch 5 zur kasse bitten 4
deutschland 22 wolfgang clement 5 an der brust 3
clement 21 100 milliarden 4 auf dem weg 3
geld 21 edmund stoiber 4 aus dem ausland 3
gewerkschaften 21 gerhard bökel 4 die grünen haben 3
meinungsseite 21
gewerkscha






ent 4 kanzler schröder und 3
öffentlichen 19 kasse bitten 4 kanzler umkurvt
vermögenst
euer 3
dienst 18 verdi droht 4
ministerpräs
ident roland koch 3
höhere 18
dramatische










er eichel 3 nach der wahl 3
sigmar 18
fraktionsche
f müntefering 3 nicht das schiff 3










müntefering 17 heftige kritik 3 schröder spricht machtwort 3
verdi 17 heide simonis 3 sparmodell
erbschaftste
uer teil 3
milliarden 16 höheren abgaben 3 spd und grüne 3
cdu 15 kanzler umkurvt 3 stunde der wahrheit 3
gerhard 15 lehnt
vermögensteu
er 3 tarifstreit im öffentlichen 3
koalition 15
ministerpräs




Tab. A.6: thirty most frequent words, bigrams and trigrams in headline and lead paragraph 

















uer 283 angela merkel 54 der großen koalition 46
spd 258 großen koalition 48 union und spd 42
union 171 große koalition 32 die reform der 32
koalition 153 erwin huber 31 die große koalition 26
reform 127 peer steinbrück 26
bundeskanzl
erin angela merkel 18
seehofer 115 günther beckstein 23 in der spd 18
merkel 92 kurt beck 20 bei der
erbschaftste
uer 16
cdu 89 frankwalter steinmeier 19 peer steinbrück spd 15
bayern 88
bundeskanz
lerin angela 18 cdu und csu 14
münchen 84 georg
fahrenscho
n 18 in der großen 14
fdp 81 oskar lafontaine 17 eine reform der 13
horst 70 steinbrück spd 15
ministerpräsi
dent günther beckstein 13
erben 68 martin zeil 13 vor allem die 13
partei 67
ministerprä
sident günther 13 streit um die 12
großen 64 peter ramsauer 13 um die
erbschaftste
uer 12
huber 59 peter struck 12 von union und 12





er peer steinbrück 11
deutschen 56 franz
münteferin
g 11 in den vergangenen 11
ministerpräs
ident 56 michael glos 11 mit der spd 11
deutschland 53 roland koch 10 zur reform der 11
erbschaftste
uer 52 volker kauder 10 in der csu 10
steuern 52
bundesfina
nzminister peer 9 von der steuer 10
kanzlerin 51 klaus michael 9 angela merkel cdu 9
streit 51 merkel cdu 9
bundesfinan
zminister peer steinbrück 9
steuer 50 michael groll 9 für die csu 9
bayerischen 49
ministerprä
sident horst 9 in der koalition 9
dokument 48 axel springer 8 klaus michael groll 9
politik 46 csuchef erwin 8
ministerpräsi
dent horst seehofer 9
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Tab. A.7: thirty most frequent words, bigrams and trigrams in headline and lead paragraph 













spd 196 peer steinbrück 55 spd und grüne 21
steuern 131 höhere steuern 33 arm und reich 16
grünen 130 angela merkel 30 in den vergangenen 13
deutschland 118 françois hollande 30 spd und grünen 12
steinbrück 103 jürgen trittin 26 vor allem die 12
grüne 94 gérard depardieu 20 zwischen arm und 12
union 94 sigmar gabriel 18 die einführung einer 10
deutschen 91 wolfgang schäuble 15 union und fdp 10
vermögenst





geld 76 steuern zahlen 14 auf dem weg 9
partei 76 martin greive 13 höhere steuern für 9
merkel 74 dorothea siems 12 in höhe von 9
zahlen 69 jochen gaugele 12 präsident françois hollande 9
fdp 64 große koalition 11
spdkanzlerka
ndidat peer steinbrück 9
frankreich 62 soziale
gerechtigk
eit 11 von spd und 9
milliarden 61 stefan reinecke 10 daniel friedrich sturm 8
reichensteue
r 59 matthias kamann 9 eine große koalition 8
peer 58 präsident françois 9 nach der wahl 8
koalition 57
spdkanzlerk
andidat peer 9 steuern für reiche 8
politik 57 ulf poschardt 9 vor der wahl 8
höhere 55 ulrich schulte 9 an den kosten 7
csu 54 barack obama 8 bei den grünen 7
hollande 54 claudia kade 8 cdu und csu 7
cdu 53 daniel friedrich 8 claus christian malzahn 7
regierung 53 deutschen industrie 8 die grünen wollen 7
große 50 deutschland kompakt 8 die
wiedereinf
ührung der 7
reiche 50 friedrich sturm 8 mit der union 7
staat 50 katrin
göringecka




uer 49 reichtum besteuern 8 über einer million 7
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Tab. A.8: thirty most frequent words, bigrams and trigrams in headline and lead paragraph 














uer 165 horst seehofer 36 reform der
erbschaftste
uer 43
grünen 118 angela merkel 31 die große koalition 17
spd 113 sigmar gabriel 29 die reform der 15
koalition 90 große koalition 22 der großen koalition 14
reform 71 winfried
kretschma
nn 16 daniel friedrich sturm 13
seehofer 69 großen koalition 15 bundestag und bundesrat 12
csu 63 wolfgang schäuble 14 streit über die 11
partei 60 daniel friedrich 13 wolfgang schäuble cdu 11
grüne 58 friedrich sturm 13 streit um die 10
merkel 58 donald trump 12 bei der
erbschaftste
uer 9
deutschland 54 martin greive 12 horst seehofer csu 9
große 48 schäuble cdu 12 union und spd 9
bundesrat 45 claudia kade 9 bei den grünen 8
streit 45 seehofer csu 9 bund und länder 8
steuern 43 ulrich schulte 9 bund und ländern 8
cdu 42 jürgen trittin 8 auf eine reform 7
gabriel 42 andrea nahles 7 eine reform der 7
geld 42 anton hofreiter 7 in den vergangenen 7
bundestag 41 markus söder 7 neuregelung der
erbschaftste
uer 7
erben 41 robert habeck 7 von bundestag und 7
union 39 simone peter 7 angela merkel cdu 6





zminister wolfgang schäuble 6
horst 37
bundesfina
nzminister wolfgang 6 csuchef horst seehofer 6
kompromiss 37 cem özdemir 6 für die spd 6
angela 32 csuchef horst 6 im streit um 6
vermögenst
euer 32 geplante reform 6 in der steuerpolitik 6
milliarden 31 hannes koch 6
ministerpräsi
dent horst seehofer 6
thema 31 merkel cdu 6 peter paul gantzer 6
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Tab. A.9: twenty most frequently mentioned organisations
Name of organizations No. of occurrences in 
the media coverage
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland 5152
Christlich Demokratische Union 3031
Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2412
Christlich-Soziale Union 1956
Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen 1906




Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 751
Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft 412
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 397
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 310
Bundesministerium des Innern 298
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus 290
Alternative für Deutschland 253
Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 247





Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie 197
Bundesbank 182
ALDI 169
Bundesagentur für Arbeit 160
Bundesministerium der Justiz 159
Volkswagen 155
Jungsozialistinnen und Jungsozialisten in der SPD 154
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Tab. A.10: List of organisations’ names appearing in the network (figure 3)
Number or short name Full Name
1 Agenda Austria
2 Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and Citizen's Action
3 Bertelsmann Stiftung
4 Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken
5 Eigentümerverband Haus & Grund
6 Eucken-Institut
7 Hayek Gesellschaft
Ebert Stiftung Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
9 Friedrich Naumann Stiftung für die Freiheit
Böckler-Stiftung Hans-Böckler-Stiftung
Böll-Stiftung Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung
12 Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft
IdW Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft
IMK Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung
15 Ludwig Erhard-Stiftung
16 Memo-Gruppe




ISM Institut für solidarische Moderne
22 Deutsche Vereinigung für Internationales Steuerrecht
AG Metall Arbeitgeberverband Gesamtmetall
24 Bund Junger Unternehmer
25 Bundessteuerberaterkammer
BDA Bundesverband der Deutschen Arbeitgeber
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie
28 Bundesverband deutscher Banken
DIHK Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag
30 Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft
31 Handelsverband Deutschland
32 Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft
33 Zentraler Immobilien Ausschuss
34 Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks
35 Arbeiterwohlfahrt
AfD Alternative für Deutschland
CDU/CSU Christlich Demokratische Union
Die Linke Die Linke
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund
40 Kronberger Kreis




43 Bund Katholischer Unternehmer
44 Centrum für angewandte Politikforschung
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland
IG BCE Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie und Energie
Ver.di Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft
49 Industriegewerkschaft Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt
IG Metall Industriegewerkschaft Metall
51 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut
Grüne Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen
53 Centrum für Europäische Politik
54 Weis[s]e Wirtschaft




Tab. A.11: Stance of organisations towards wealth and inheritance taxation and their occurrence in 
the newspaper coverage 
Stance towards wealth and 
inheritance taxation






Tab. A.12: No. of economists occurring in newspaper articles according to paradigmatic orientation
Paradigm No. of occurences in 
newspaper articles
other mainstream econ 247
plural mainstream econ 212
ordoliberal econ 204
postkeynesian econ 94
other heterodox econ 53
